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Article
Institutionalized Violence in the History of
Mind/Body Dualism and the
Contemporary Reality of Slavery and
Torture: Reflections on Elaine Scarry and
The Body in Pain

Wendy Lynne Lee*
Wendy Lynne Lee argues that the dualistic impulse Bibi Bakare-Yusef identifies in Elaine
Scarry’s analysis of the experience of pain has its roots at least as far back as Aristotle’s
hylomorphism, and that a clear view of contemporary structural inequality requires a
grasp of how “mind” and “body” continue to inform even anti-dualist social theory. Lee
argues that insofar as this impulse informs Scarry’s The Body in Pain, it distorts Scarry’s
analysis of the experience of pain in ways that elide important aspects of that experience.
Understanding the nature of this distortion, however, sheds light on some forms of violence
that Scarry doesn’t discuss, namely, the vital role institutionalized violence plays in the
maintenance of the social order. Lee’s analysis thus offers insight towards analyses of the
experience of pain that avoid the pitfalls of mind/body dualism and make better conceptual
and historical sense of institutions like slavery and sex-trafficking.
*Wendy

Lynne Lee is professor of philosophy at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania where she has taught
for 26 years. Her areas of specialization include feminist theory, environmental philosophy, philosophy of
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CARTESIAN “IMPULSES”
In “On the (Im)Materiality of Violence” Wendy Lynne Lee argues that despite the
mammoth effort feminist theorists have put into the critique of the mind/body dualism that
threads its way through much of the Western tradition in philosophy, it still haunts our
work, often in subtle but perilous ways (Lee 2005: 3). “Perilous,” Lee argues, because the
tacit reinforcement of what’s come to be called “Cartesian” dualism undermines our
analyses of the ways heteropatriarchal institutions privilege not only mind over body, men
over women, masculinity over femininity, but also whatever is coded as “white” over
“black” or “brown” bodies, straight over queer, global “North” over global “South,”
“West” over “East.” As Bibi Bakare-Yusef (1999) makes the point, coming to a clearer
understanding of this “impulse” in work intended to be free of it (or that explicitly eschews
it) is at least as important as the critique of mind/body dualism itself precisely because of
the ways dualism is institutionalized or naturalized in the name of the social order or
“civilization,” that is, precisely because “civilization” remains defined in the terms of
heteropatriarchal and racist prerogative. To whatever extent that Cartesian dualism
continues to “legitimate” the subjugation of women and the exploitation of those identified
as “other” in virtue of race, culture, geography, and economic class status, it becomes that
much more important to root out the ways in which its critique in the work of feminist,
anti-racist, queer, post-structuralist, post-colonial theorists may unwittingly contribute to
insuring its endurance (Lee 2005: 3).
Projects of self-reflection like the one Lee recommends are not, of course, ever
easy. But this one matters now more than ever both to theory and to emancipatory activism
for at least three reasons. First, because undertaking it might help us to understand the
recent resurgence of some highly toxic forms of masculinity defended by public
intellectuals like Jordan Peterson (Sanneh 2018) and Michael Rectenwald (Rectenwald
2019), as well as by popular Internet trolls like Mike Cernovich (Marantz 2016) and the
Proud Boy’s Gavin McInnes (Daly 2018). Second, analyses of how Cartesian dualism
remains a sometimes subtle but powerful force in arguments that aim to interrogate the
divorce of “mind” from “body” can offer valuable insight into how institutionalized
oppression survives, even thrives, despite the feminist, LGBTQ, and anti-racist
movements. Lastly, I’ll argue this insight can shed light on why otherwise valuable
analyses of specific institutions like slavery, torture, and human-trafficking—institutions
through which the use of violence functions as key to their maintenance—can sometimes
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miss clues that might lead to more decisive arguments against the guardians of
“civilization.” In short, if among our aims is not merely to understand why it is that the
structural inequalities of heteropatriarchal and racist institutions survive, or even grow, but
to build a resistance that is effective, our first task must be the careful examination of how
some of the arguments we’ve made or adopted as our own actually reproduce aspects of
the dualisms that help to preserve these institutions. This paper tries to take that step back
in order to help us take more clear-sighted steps forward. One of these highly valuable
analyses is offered by Elaine Scarry in her seminal work, The Body in Pain (1987); it’s
also, however, an example of how the Cartesian “impulse” unwittingly reproduced can
have disastrous consequences.
RETURNING TO ELAINE SCARRY’S THE BODY IN PAIN
Bakare-Yusef argues that insofar as Cartesian dualism is at the root of structural inequality,
it’s important to identify it even in arguments that purport to critique traditional notions of
“mind” and “body.” Elaine Scarry’s seminal work, The Body in Pain, offers an example
important not merely because her arguments evidence a Cartesian impulse, but because
their principle focus is an experience critical to the formation of human identity: pain.
Scarry’s analysis of the experience of pain, argues Bakare-Yusef, is rooted in Western
philosophy reaching back at least to Aristotle’s hylomorphic conception of the subject, but
its significance isn’t merely historical, a point that Lee seeks to expand in the interest of
exposing its deeply-rooted persistence. Lee argues that Bakare-Yusef’s recognition of the
Cartesian impulse in Scarry’s work can shed light not only on the history of mind/body
dualism, but on some incarnations of the institutionalized violence at which Scarry hints,
but never really develops in her discussion of the body in pain. My aim is to take this latter
point—keeping its history in full view—a bit further still, and show that Lee’s argument
points towards:


A clearer view of the violence that functions as vital to the maintenance of a
heteropatriarchal and intrinsically racist social order, and how Cartesian dualism
helps to sustain and justify these forms of violence.



Contextualized analyses of the experience of pain that, as Bakare-Yusef suggests,
are more compelling because they avoid the pitfalls of mind/body dualism that
ultimately compromise Scarry’s work.
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The possibility of articulating more effective strategies of resistance against
resurgent forms of institutionalized violence masquerading as a reclamation of
entitled masculinity.
Lee begins with Aristotle. Central to her argument is that for Aristotle, the

hylomorphic “soul” (psyche) acts as the principle of animation of a living thing—not as a
separable entity (De Anima, hereafter DA 414a 26–28). Rather, “hylomorphism…
comprehends ‘mind’ not as something external to ‘body,’ but as a defining ontological and
existential algorithm which differentiates species according to the unique characteristics of
their form” (DA 412a 19–21, 412a 27–8, 412b 5–6, 412b 15–17). The trouble with
hylomorphism, at least for Aristotle, is that it fails to differentiate within species, or at least
within the human species, in the manner necessary to legitimate a hierarchical social order
anchored in subjugation according to race, sex, and class. It’s thus not surprising that he
retreats to dualism in order to posit intellect as the un-enmattered potential for the activity
of knowing (a pure becoming of the object known) available exclusively to those whose
leisure of mind is guaranteed through the laboring bodies of others. While scholars debate
the best way to interpret these passages, it seems clear that for Aristotle the subject of the
intellective “soul” is essentially dualist, reasserting the authority not only of mind over
body, but of all those identified with mind over those identified with body in Aristotle’s
psychic hierarchy.
Aiming to reserve knowing to a knower “unpolluted” by embodied experience
(DA 429a 10–13, 429a 21–28), Aristotle’s turn to dualism naturalizes a social order within
which race, sex and class determine social status for the hierarchies of household and state,
themselves analogues of his psychic hierarchy—and the contortions it undertakes to
exempt its privileged knower. That aristocratic Greek men occupy the Zenith of this
hierarchy isn’t surprising; in the end, the ethnocentric and masculinist social order of the
Politics triumphs over De Anima’s fleeting intimation of epistemic, moral, and civic
equality. Or perhaps closer to the truth: the need for slaves (war booty or wives) to perform
the labor that liberates the patrician class to its philosophical pursuits wins out over the
integrity of such pursuits themselves. In any case, what in Aristotle is legitimation of a
regime rooted in race, sex, and class is for many to follow, Scarry included, a missed
opportunity to theorize a “subject” in whose identity these factors play a formative role.
This is not to say that Scarry fails to recognize that institutions play key roles as causal
agents in the somatic, perceptual, cognitive, affective, and epistemic experience of slaves,
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torture victims, rape victims, prisoners of war, refugees, asylum seekers, and others. She
clearly recognizes this, if somewhat obliquely, when she observes of slaves that
the slave still authorizes the movement of his body as he each day wakes
up, walks to the pyramid, puts his hand to the stone, and begins to lift
and carry. Perhaps he believes that the very beautiful artifact to which he
contributes his embodied labor implicitly includes him in its civilizing
embrace, that he is its partial author. Perhaps instead he perceives
himself as excluded, but chooses … to devote his lifetime to this aimless
project rather than to the shorter life’s project of rebellion. (Scarry, 1987:
156–57)
Although Scarry situates her example in the Egypt of the pyramid builders, it feels
as if it could have hailed from anytime, anywhere. Indeed, she reinforces this sentiment
when she later remarks that “[s]lavery, whether occurring in ancient Egypt or in the
nineteenth century American South, was an arrangement in which physical work was
demanded of a population whose membership were themselves cut off from the ownership,
control, and enjoyment of the products they produced” (ibid., 170).
The trouble with this approach, however, is that while it’s true that varieties of
subjugation like slavery share similar practical characteristics across time and geography,
these facts cannot speak to the specific ways in which the institutions responsible for
enslavement affect and actuate the identity of the slave. Speculation about what slaves
might believe, in what they might be invested, what they fear isn’t the same thing as
investigating how pyramid building as an artifact of ancient Egyptian civilization, its
cultural practices, its structures of government, agriculture, arts, its military conquests, its
language, and its specific forms of institutionalized violence—the ways in which “the
slave” instantiates “the laboring body”—inform not merely the slave’s beliefs, but the
experience of the stone under his hands, the feel of his “lift and carry,” the attenuation of
his hope by the end of the day. Recognizing in ancient Egypt, nineteenth century America,
or twenty-first century Malaysia causal agents responsible for the production of “the body
in pain” qua slavery isn’t the same thing as probing the specific conditions under which
subjugation imbues identity—how the “civilization” of such regimes is made manifest in
the very ways in which the subjugated experience and conceive themselves, their lives, and
their labor.
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Consider a very different example, this time from Kathryn Yusoff’s vitiating
critique of an institution we’re unlikely to associate, at least obviously, with oppression,
much less with slavery, namely, the science of geology. In her introduction to A Billion
Black Anthropocenes or None, Yusoff argues that what she calls “White Geology,” that is,
a scientific discipline governed not only by the pursuit of knowledge of the planet’s
geologic composition and history, but by the lucrative hydrocarbon and mineral
extractivism that geology makes possible, cannot be rightly understood without
appreciating the use of slavery and the dualisms deployed to justify it:
The division between the figures of the human and inhuman and its
manifestations in subjective life exhibits one of the most terrible
consequences of the division of materiality organized and practiced as a
biopolitical tool of governance. The division of matter into nonlife and
life pertains not only to the matter but to the racial organization of life as
foundational to New World geographies. The biopolitical category of
nonbeing was established through slaves being exchanged for and as
gold. Slavery was a geologic axiom of the inhuman in which nonbeing
was made, reproduced, and circulated as flesh … The rendering of
nonbeings in colonial extractive practices…its exchange and circulation,
demonstrates what Christina Sharp … calls the “monstrous” intimacy of
the subjective powers of geology, where gold shows up as bodies and
bodies are the surplus of mineralogical extraction. (Yusoff 2018: 4–5)
Human and inhuman, living and non-living, being and nonbeing, white and
nonwhite, master and colonized, owner and slave—each of these dualisms inscribes a
feature of the structural inequality upon which the extractivist practice of gold mining
depends. In the geography of the New World, of course, it could just as well be silver
mining in the Andes (Robins 2011), uranium mining in the American West (Churchill
1992), or diamond mining in Sierra Leone (Barry 2017). While Yusoff’s focus isn’t the
experience of being subjugated to slavery as a “geologic axiom” per se, we can well
imagine the “monstrous intimacies” experienced day in and day out in the layering of
minerals as human bodies dehumanized, as racialized bodies imbricated in and as exchange
value in the “biopolitical,” that is, in power instantiated in and over organisms whose labor
derives from living, but who, “rendered as nonbeing” defines colonialism as emblematic
of civilization.

Institutionalized Violence 12
Yet, White Geology isn’t (exactly) slavery to Egyptian pyramid building, though
both deal in stones, and injury, and pain. White Geology isn’t (exactly) slavery on the
cotton plantations of the pre-Civil War American South, though both require labor on one’s
knees. White Geology isn’t child sex-trafficking, although the prospect of being on one’s
knees scrabbling for survival may be an apt description for both. What makes White
Geology different, and thus an example of how easy it is to overlook the Cartesian dualism
authorizing the institutionalized violence upon which these extractivist practices depend,
is that Egyptian pyramid building, cotton plantation slavery, and sex-trafficking are without
the legitimating narrative provided by science. That is, geology as white geology offers an
even more troubling example of the sheer reach of Cartesian dualism into the justificatory
narratives that produce, in addition to blood diamonds, petrochemicals, silver coins, the
bodies in pain of Scarry’s analysis. Context matters: as Yusoff argues, white geology is
geology—even though it’s also “a mode of accumulation, on the one hand, and of
dispossession, on the other, depending on which side of the geologic color line you end up
on” (Yusoff 2018: 3). The ways in which pyramid building becomes inscribed on the
Egyptian’s arms and legs may resemble the scars of the slaver’s whip on the back of the
nineteenth century African’s or the bruises disfiguring the face of a twenty-first century
sex-trafficked child, or the mercury poisoned body of the Andean silver miner (Robins
2011: 7). But recognizing family resemblances among enslaved “bodies in pain” is no
substitute for interrogating how “civilization,” or perhaps better, racist economies of
entitlement, comes to be inscribed on the identities of those whose laboring bodies form
the brick and mortar of its achievements. Some forms of subjugation are obvious, but others
are just as deeply institutionalized as forms of violence, just as vibrant to the experience of
pain, but so fully concealed, legitimated, imbricated, and naturalized in the narratives of
science, or “nature” or “economic trade” or “exchange value” that the subjugated identities
actuated in their performance as labor and/or resource remains largely invisible despite the
reinforcement of the structural inequalities that define sex, gender, and race.

VOCABULARIES OF TORTURE/ “SPECTACLES OF POWER”
Building on—but also moving decidedly away from—her discussion of slavery, Scarry
argues that the language used in acts of torture “goes on to deny, to falsify, the reality of
the very thing it has objectified by a perceptual shift which converts the vision of suffering
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into the wholly illusory but, to the torturers and the regime they represent, wholly
convincing spectacle of power” (Scarry 1987: 27). The context of this perceptual shift,
however, matters greatly. As in slavery, the laboring body of the tortured is
instrumentalized in the service of preserving a “spectacle of power,” a regime always
potentially jeopardized by those voices that would seek to disrupt it. In this case, however,
the labor solicited is not the mining of diamonds, the laying of brick, or the harvesting of
cotton, but rather speech, or specifically “actionable information,” and the laborer is coded
not as subjugate, but rather as a different kind of “other,” namely, “enemy,” “suicide
bomber,” “terrorist.” Following in the tradition mirrored by the work of, for example,
Michel Foucault (Lee 2005: 20–21) Scarry shows how specifically tailored vocabularies
are used to create a perceptual shift in the context of torture in order to insure the “body in
pain” functions toward the preservation of state regimes, but her primary focus is on how
this shift objectifies the identity of the tortured subject. Insofar, however, as vocabulary
reflects specific aspects of the contexts in which it is useful, it’s vitally important to
articulate, for example, what aspects may be relevant to the history, geopolitics, and
geographies of that context. How else can we distinguish the ways in which “the body in
pain” may reflect and affect this very different “spectacle of power”? As in her analysis of
slavery, Scarry misses an opportunity to situate torture in at least one of the contexts crucial
to understanding it as an epistemic as well as a racialized and gendered geopolitical
instrument: terrorism.
In Genealogies of Terrorism, Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson provides precisely
this crucial context and thus an opportunity to correct and substantively expand on Scarry’s
original work. Arguing that “if we want to understand what terrorism is, we must first
determine what the term means, how it functions in a given context, and how it is
operationalized as an element in different discursive and nondiscursive practices”
(Erlenbusch-Anderson 2018: 4), Erlenbusch-Anderson shows that the meaning of
“terrorism” cannot be neatly reduced to an act of political violence regardless its origin,
but instead involves an indefinite and evolving range of other terms and practices, (ibid.,
30–31). Evolving definitions of terrorism, she argues, bear in important ways on how we
understand the subject as a citizen, worker, dissident, or outlaw (ibid., 121–22). In short,
both Scarry and Erlenbusch-Anderson show that operationalizing concepts like “terrorism”
and “torture” can become crucial to the state’s pursuit of power, however much that power
is more than “spectacle” or theater than reality. But Erlenbusch-Anderson goes much
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further in showing how “interlopers” who challenge the state by defying its geographic and
geopolitical borders both define the state and are themselves defined by the state as
terrorists (and not as slaves, citizens, patriarchs, etc.) in virtue not only of the threat they
pose to the stability of the state, but because the state needs risks against which to erect
itself not merely as spectacle but as a powerful—authoritative—regime (ibid., 31).
State regimes, argues Erlenbusch-Anderson, legitimate themselves through the
institutionalizing of various commercial (ibid., 136), policing (ibid., 47), colonialist (ibid.,
124), and military ventures (ibid., 151–53). It’s thus not surprising that among the state’s
“mechanisms of social defense” (ibid., 11) are included methods of interrogation deployed
to protect the state against those whose actions threaten its legitimating institutions.
Torture, of course, needn’t be included in interrogation, but as Erlenbusch-Anderson shows
(ibid., 121–22), it can come to be so depending upon the context, for instance, that of
militarized colonialist expansion and the resultant necessity of policing entire, often
resistant as well as subjugated peoples (in Algiers or Russia, for example). Narrowing her
focus to the effects of torture for the particular subject, Scarry argues that torture doesn’t
merely subjugate, but de-subjectifies its subject, converting the subject into, for example,
the “terrorist” or “suicide bomber,” converting the tortured not “merely” into the enslaved,
but into a specific kind of object, one that can produce “actionable information.” 1 It’s only,
however, a specific context, one wherein information could be actuated, that such a
conversion is meaningful. After all, torture can have other purposes such as punishment,
entertainment or retaliation, none of which restrict themselves to “terrorist” or “suicide
bomber” because none are necessarily for the production of information. The use of torture
cannot therefore be defined merely by its capacity to inflict pain; torture, in other words,
isn’t about one instantiation of “the body in pain.” Rather, “torture” names an extractive
procedure through which a particular object—the tortured—can be “rendered,”
“excavated,” or “transformed” into a site of information (into a “stand in” for the
information itself) available, if not to the public, to public imagination in the form of
pronouncements, “findings,” “raids,” the “neutralizing” of explosives or their sponsors,
and the like.
As a representative of some authorizing body, presumably the state, the torturer
walks a precariously thin line: denying and affirming that torture induces suffering. Any
other objective beyond the extraction of information—entertainment, punishment, and/or
retaliation—is liable to incite universal moral condemnation. Yet, the terrorist only
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constitutes “terrorist” through the resistance imputed to him, resistance that justifies using
pain to extract information deemed essential to the preservation of the state. Put differently:
“terrorist,” “infidel,” “suicide bomber,” or, more recently, “ISIS-Fighter” or “al Qaida
operative” supply the linguistically orchestrated permission to create an incarnation of the
“body in pain” as a “body” of information not because state authority is secure, but
precisely because it is illusory. It’s not merely that if the state’s “spectacle of power” were
more convincing it wouldn’t need to resort to such extreme measures; it’s that the spectacle
of power itself—and thus the closest approximation of its reality—is created through the
propagandized threat (even if not the actual practice) of torture. At the same time, however,
the state must legitimate itself through a façade of reason, itself accomplished through
eliding the practice of torture as extractive—as a form of institutionalized violence—via
the justificatory and euphemistic language of, for example, “enhanced interrogation” or
through staging a largely disingenuous public punditry around whether water-boarding is
really torture, whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the pursuit of terrorists, or whether
“extra-judicial” actions can be legitimated by high-casualty events like 9/11. But whether
the use of torture will be effective in achieving a spectacle at once spectacular and rational,
terrorizing and reassuring as a “mechanism of social defense” depends on the power of a
contextually specific vocabulary, one that produces a body in pain coded as “terrorist,”
“suicide bomber,” and the like, a body whose display of guilt empowers the state not
merely to enslave, but to demonize as enemy.
The use of torture must thus be orchestrated in such a way as to produce a body
that can be disposed to compel a subject to divulge useful information, a body that can
incite an informative exchange by a subject otherwise resistant, but who must also be coded
as outside civilization, and therefore bereft of its protections. In other words, torture can
function as a spectacle of power, but it can only function as a spectacle of power for the
state—as a mechanism of social defense—if the subject to which it’s applied is
simultaneously able to be conceived as an object—as a “mind” capable of comprehending
interrogation and providing information, and as a body that can be discarded by the state
as a terrorist who subsists outside the bounds of civilized life. Such a subject must be coded
such as to incite a shift of perception that permits “it” to be denied any right to be treated
as other than an object. It’s thus precisely because what is revealed by the subject of torture
is information, not incoherent drivel, because it’s actionable, not frivolous or dissipating,
that what is vital to torture’s justification as a spectacle of state power is its rootedness in
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a Cartesian dualism implicit but decisive: mind may speak the language of the body’s
experience of suffering, but it’s only because the body can function as a tool for others that
the subject can be made to utter truth, or at least evince the appearance of truth. Calibrating
the torture according to the content, to the spectacle of truth imputed to it, is thus critical,
and a heavy theatrical burden borne by the torturer-interrogator. Insofar, moreover, as
legitimating the state hangs on whether its content is “actionable,” a way must be found to
claim that whatever is divulged is true, is divulged by a suspect whose “guilt” “justifies”
the use of torture whatever else is discharged during “interrogation,” including tears,
excrement, vomit, or even death. Indeed, such “evidences” of suffering tend to lend
themselves to the appearance of truth if only because they insinuate a suspect trying to
avoid expelling what surely must be true (why otherwise would they try so hard?), but who
fails to keep it, or anything else, in.
Consider the U.S. war on terror. It provides a context and a linguistic menu that
can be used to normalize an incarnation of the body in pain that not only personifies in the
suffering of its subject the power of the state, but does so because what is divulged is (or
can be made to seem) true. The state must thus produce the “spectacle” not only of the
“terrorist” who talks, but the “terrorist” who can signify the state’s “achievement” in the
use of torture—the state itself—by speaking truth. But herein lies an additional problem
for Scarry’s account of the body in pain, one that solicits the Cartesian impulse. Scarry
argues that what the use of torture actually illustrates is not the stability and strength of the
state, but rather its opposite: instability. It’s “precisely because,” she writes, “[the state’s]
power is so highly contestable, the regime so unstable, that torture is being used” (ibid.,
27). In other words, the state resorts to the use of torture in order to stabilize itself through
the (re)assertion of its capacity for brutality on the bodies of its subjects. It effectively
inscribes on these bodies its “achievement” as the state. But critical to this achievement is
not merely use of the language of torture as a kind of performance, but a vocabulary that
denotes success. The conversion of the subject tortured into a vehicle of information can
only be successful, in other words, if the information is information—is actionable. The
subject therefore cannot be dissolved into a suffering that risks the loss of the capacity to
divulge what the state requires to secure itself as an achievement; the state depends on at
least the appearance of the disclosure of truth. Otherwise the state appears not merely
arbitrary as well as brutal but clamoring for a stability it does not have and cannot achieve.
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Scarry is right that the use of torture plays a role in re-stabilizing the state (or at
least the functional appearance). It’s not, however, the torture itself that can produce this
effect; it’s the Cartesian dualism that underwrites the prospect of information. It’s truth (or
“truth”) supplied by a subject whose capacity for language is not epistemically
compromised by torture that functions to re-stabilize the state. Scarry is thus right too that
language plays a critical role; but it’s not the language itself as it’s utilized by the state, it’s
the capacity for language defined in the Cartesian terms of information, as the capacity for
truth-telling despite the objectification of the suffering body that authorizes the use of
torture by the state as a mechanism for social-defense. Indeed, torture without the prospect
of divulging actionable information threatens to destabilize the state in at least two ways:
first, its production of the body in pain is unlikely to be able to be de-subjectified; we feel
empathy, at least pity, for the subject tortured arbitrarily. This subject can only count as a
“terrorist” on the morally repugnant grounds that retaliation, or worse, entertainment is a
permissible activity of the state; but that is not a terrorist, and hence this resort to torture is
itself destabilizing. Second, insofar as the prospect of being in possession of information
is what defines the subject despite the torture to which the body is subjugated, any other
state objective appears to deny (or defy) the Cartesian dualism that forms its foundation by
denying the epistemic rift between the truth-telling mind and the suffering-reducible body.
To deny the prospect of truth-telling is to deny “actionable” is to deny “mechanism of selfdefense” is to deny the legitimacy of the state itself.
Put simply: the point of utilizing torture as a method of interrogation is to make
the terrorist suspect speak—not choke, not vomit, not drift towards psychosis, or die: speak.
But given that this epistemic production of the body in pain is not about pain, but rather
the use of pain in order to extract speech, and given that, according to the vocabulary of
what is necessary to insure the stability of the state, the speech extracted must be
“actionable,” “torture” is simply whatever, short of death, produces that end. To be clear,
“actionable” is no more about truth than this production of “body” is about pain; but it is
about a spectacle of power that produces the appearance of the state’s commitment not
merely to the exercise of power, but to an epistemically authorized exercise of power.
Scarry’s analysis of the ways in which torture signifies instability founders because it fails
to account for the enormous task contained in the epistemic relationship between the
tortured and the torturer in the service of “speak.” She’s right that were the state stable, it
would not likely resort to torture. It wouldn’t need to. Or: it might—as a mechanism of
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social defense, as a reminder of the spectacle it can wield. Either way, she misses the extent
to which the state’s willingness to utilize torture as a form of interrogation reproduces the
Cartesian impulse Bakare-Yusef identifies, and with it the likelihood of a regime that,
should its power be challenged from within or without, will resort to ever-more violent and
self-defeating measures for the sake of preserving the appearance that its power is founded
in truth.

THE TRUTH ABOUT TORTURE/THE MYTH THAT TORTURE
IS ABOUT TRUTH
There’s another problem, also rooted in the Cartesian impulse that haunts Scarry’s account:
her argument appears to assume that torture is effective (or is able to be made to appear
so), that it does (or at least could) produce actionable information. Indeed, even on a highly
charitable reading of The Body in Pain, Melanie Richter-Montpetit’s, the prospect of
“actionable” must remain available to the act of torture—even if only to veil more nefarious
purposes (or precisely because it can do so):
Scarry argues similarly that “the fact that something is asked as if the
content of the answers matters,” noting that “while the content of the
prisoner’s answer is only sometimes important to the regime, the form
of the answer, the fact of answering, is always crucial.” (RichterMontpetit 2014: 55)
In other words, while the torturer and the regime represented in the act of
producing the body in pain may well know that the content of the prisoner’s answer may
not be actionable, that fact has little bearing on the performance of the torture because it’s
the appearance that matters, an appearance moored to a “fact of answering” that has as its
purpose preserving the spectacle of the empowered state. “State-administered security
practices like torture and detention,” contends Richter-Montpetit, “do not simply constitute
a display of authority and domination, but produce state sovereignty and subjection through
the very exercise of terror” (ibid.). This too, however, is not quite right. State sovereignty
is not produced through the sheer exercise of terror; it’s produced through the “fact of
answering,” that is, through the linguistic performance of the de-subjectified tortured
subject who, by answering, keeps fully alive the possibility of actionable, and thus
personifies the critical hedge against a sovereignty on the edge of barbarism. Sovereignty
is itself, in other words, a function of the prospect of a truth that can become content to the

19 Wendy Lynne Lee
“fact of answering.” Answering, after all, isn’t babble; it embodies the relationship between
the tortured who answers, informatively or not, and the torturer who asks.
As Richter-Montpetit acknowledges, however, maintaining the appearance of
“answering” is very difficult (ibid., 55–56). In fact, as Michael Shermer argues, it may be
impossible, reducing sovereignty to an “exercise of terror,” and thus the state to barbarism.
The immense and uncompromising weight of history, argues Shermer, is not on the side of
“actionable,” the effects of which can only be destabilizing. So the problem for Scarry is
that she argues that the use of torture helps to sustain the illusion of the epistemically
authorized state. But that authority doesn’t derive from the torture; it derives from the
information that ostensibly justifies its use, and thus the Cartesian dualism that underwrites
the claim that what the suffering subject speaks is informative, or at least could be. But
torture has never been an effective method of interrogation, producing in fact, the legion
of consequences Richter-Montpetit spells out. Whatever fiction the state promotes to
preserve its veneer of stability, the jig is still up short of a Herculean effort to convince the
public otherwise. The use of torture may preserve the state’s spectacle of power, but it
cannot preserve the epistemic justification for this projection of stability because it cannot
guarantee “actionable.”
But, as Richter-Montpetit and Erlenbusch-Anderson both intimate, what the
historical and geopolitical context of the uses of torture actually shows is that the spectacle
of the powerful state as sheer spectacle is strengthened precisely because the state appears
unstable. It’s the tangible appearance of the state’s effort to re-stabilize that actually
empowers it. “Stability,” after all, is the difference between legitimate sovereign and
terrorizing barbarism, and it's the state that appears to be striving for the former that can
command authority (and can thus utilize whatever means are at its disposal for maintain
order). The state cannot jettison the myth that torture can produce actionable information
because that would be to concede that its spectacle of power just is thinly veiled barbarism.
But it also cannot relinquish the appearance of being threatened by “terrorism” because
that is precisely what allows the state to practice barbarism in the name of achieving truth.
Because torture doesn’t work it can’t be the stability of the state that becomes
inscribed on the body of the tortured, but rather instability seeking its level in the “fact of
answering.” This epitomizes the relationship of the tortured to the torturer, but by example
also the subject to the state. As Melanie Richter-Montpetit makes this point: “the effects of
extreme pain and suffering on the body are complex and difficult to predict, and hence it’s
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impossible to administer extreme suffering in a controlled way” (ibid., 45). But control
isn’t the point, the appearance of interrogation under circumstances that make the state
appear not barbaric but heroic—that is the point. In fact, Richter-Montpetit continues,
“[d]espite the enormous efforts and resources invested, the USA’s post-9/11 global torture
regime yielded not a single documented case of actionable data. If anything, the use of
torture has led to blowbacks due to false intelligence and disrupted relationships with
prisoners who cooperated” (ibid.).
Among the ways in which this relationship is disrupted is that torture demolishes,
Scarry argues, the use of language for its victims; the very speech which is its vital product
can be suffocated right along with the faulty divorce of mind from body. This may happen
in several ways, each of which effectively deconstructs the particular iteration of Cartesian
dualism that the myth of “actionable” depends on. Richter-Montpetit observes, for
example, that “more injury does not necessarily produce more pain but can lead to
desensitization,” and that “the administration of pain may also strengthen prisoners’
resistance and typically results in even cooperative prisoners being unable to recall even
simple information of the past … or may cause the ‘illusion of knowing’ due to sleep loss,
exhaustion, or brain trauma” (ibid.). Scarry argues that “[a] fifth dimension of physical
pain is its ability to destroy language,” and that among the achievements of torture is the
damage it does to the capacity for speech (Scarry 1987: 54). But consider: Scarry tacitly
acknowledges the extent to which the formulation of words is embodied in the tongue,
mouth, and vocal chords, and that this ability is vital to the identity and integrity of the
tortured. Cutting out the tongue, for example, does not merely produce the body in pain, it
signifies a critical form of subjugation—the erasure of a distinctively human capacity. The
tortured cannot be deprived of knowing words (short of death) but can be made unable to
utter words. Yet, as Jacques Ranciere argues in “Ten Theses on Politics” (2001), the right
to speak defines at least in part what it is to be a terrorist suspect since, first, an act of terror
is a kind of speech, and second because “actionable” depends utterly on speech.
Let’s take a step back: the subjugated aren’t deprived of words per se; it’s that the
right to speak is itself preemptively precluded for any utterance other than that elicited by
the torturer. It’s not, in other words, language that’s destroyed, but the right to use
language—truth-telling or otherwise. Ranciere argues in Thesis 7.20 that the right to speak
(or be heard) forms an essential aspect of the relationship between the political and the
function of the police in that what can be said acts, in effect, as that which can be policed.
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As Ranciere puts it: “[t]he police is not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the
social. The essence of the police is neither repression nor even control over the living. Its
essence is a certain manner of partitioning the sensible” (Ranciere 2001: 8). Such
“partitioning” must then include the right to the linguistic since it’s through language that
the “symbolic constitution of the social” is not only performed but constitutive of the
sensible—the experiential “world.”
Given a partitioning whose first and foremost objective is social order, it’s hardly
surprising that, for Ranciere, although politics stands opposed to the police (ibid.), it
nonetheless performs the function of acting as a first intervention upon the “visible and the
sayable.” So too for Scarry in that it is the social order, the “spectacle,” which is preserved
in the relationship of the torturer to the tortured. What is preemptively precluded are thus
those words that would “disrupt” the functionality of that relationship, words that might
endanger the “principle function” of politics, namely, “the configuration of its proper
space” (ibid., 5). What such preemption shows then is that the interrogator isn’t just a
worker hired to do a grisly job; indeed, as torturer “he” is situated epistemically,
kinesthetically, psychologically, socially in that larger context as a candidate for a position
elevated and concealed by its title: “interrogator.” He’ll have a suitable disposition for
achieving the presumptive goals of torture, and he’ll likely be a male beneficiary of the
regime. Yet without an analysis of that larger context, including how language comes to
be appropriated by the regime that empowers the torturer, the picture—the spectacle—that
emerges is bound to omit precisely the factors that make the institution of torture possible.

FROM TORTURE TO SEX-TRAFFICKING:
SUBJECTIFICATION/DE-SUBJECTIFICATION
To sum up, Scarry’s missed opportunities are at least threefold:


First, even an insightful description of the effects of the uses of violence—such
as silencing the subject—isn’t the same thing as an analysis of the institutions that
incorporate violence as a naturalized part of their claims to power and depend on
elided notions of “truth” contained in the demand for “actionable.” What
Erlenbusch-Anderson, Richter-Montpetit, and Ranciere each show, albeit in
differing ways, is that the power of the state cannot come to be the “spectacle”
Scarry references save for the larger context within which it can create an
epistemically convincing vocabulary of its enforcement.

Institutionalized Violence 22


Second, omitting to examine how such “spectacles” come to be institutionalized
itself exemplifies the dualist impulse Bakare-Yusef identifies in Scarry’s view of
suffering, particularly with respect to how that impulse seduces us to believe that
we can turn to “the body in pain” without undertaking an investigation into
subjugated subject’s identity as enslaved, tortured, raped, imprisoned, evicted, etc.



Third, however otherwise insightful is Scarry’s discussion of language and
torture, references to the “body in pain” as if these could be made sense of in
abeyance of that dualist impulse reinforces not only the role that language plays
in subjugation, but the ways in which language can be distorted through elision,
euphemism, etc., in the interest of preserving the authority of an empowered
regime, and thus its prerogative to define “rights” and to whom they belong.

Abstracting “the body in pain” as an object dissociable from the specific contexts within
which its subjects are likely already positioned as vulnerable to subjugation reiterates a
gendered, racialized, and psychic hierarchy within which language functions to insure the
segregation of laboring bodies and the regimes who subjugate them. Hence, giving
examples from, say, Greece, Chile, the Philippines, or South Vietnam—but treating “the
body in pain” as if its experiential characteristics are largely the same for each—functions
not only to elide the many ways in which violence is utilized to specific objectives, it
effectively erases it as institutionalized, yielding a distorted—essentially dualist—picture
of a subject embodied in and by that violence, yet without moorings in the very material
institutions responsible for it.
Other than as points of reference or departure, the bodies of Scarry’s ruminations
seem to float free of any facts that might get in the way of turning to the pain. Yet it’s
precisely the historical, cultural, political, and religious facts of these institutions and the
complex ways in which they intersect with each other that inform and normalize the
processes through which a subject comprehends and affects herself as a subject, that is, as
a subject of experience. Let’s call such processes “subjectification.” The subject whose
identity is affected as an instrument for maintaining institutions that rely on the threat of
violence, we’ll call the subjugated subject. Consider then the relationship between sextraffickers in Malaysia, the Transpacific Partnership global trade pact, and the United
States’ decision to upgrade Malaysia’s status as a human right’s violator:
The United States is upgrading Malaysia from the lowest tier on its list
of worst human trafficking centres, US sources said on Wednesday, a
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move that could smooth the way for an ambitious US-led free-trade deal
with the south-east Asian nation and 11 other countries. The upgrade to
so-called “tier two watch list” status removes a potential barrier to
President Barack Obama’s signature global trade deal. The upgrade
follows international scrutiny and outcry over Malaysian efforts to
combat human trafficking after the discovery this year of scores of
graves in people-smuggling camps near its northern border with
Thailand. (Reuters/Guardian, July 2015)
It’s not hard to imagine in what ways this “constitution of the social,” a highly
charged intersection of political, economic, and cultural forces subjectifies and subjugates
a very specific “subject,” namely, she who is affected as an instrument of both twenty-first
century slavery and a commodified object of trade in the international market of public
appearances. That the upgrade in status follows no substantive improvement in respect for
human rights only makes the central point more cynically: positing a “body in pain”
abstracted from its specific contextual conditions distracts us from the very institutions, in
this case slavery condoned via the demands of multinational capitalism, responsible for not
only pain but subjectification in/as pain: subjugation.
Such subjects experience pain not only in the body, but in expectation itself
formed within regimes whose oppressive “spectacle” pervades every aspect of experience,
emotion and perception; institutionalized violence is that violence which saturates every
facet of a subject’s epistemic situation, making a mockery of the notion of human rights
beyond the context we identify as responsible for suffering. Put differently: did we take
Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of living things seriously all the way up the psychic
hierarchy, we’d see that human identity consists at least in crucial part in our relationship
to and within the institutions that affect or actuate us as subjects; so too as subjugated
subjects. The key difference is that in a society not only stratified on the basis of race, sex,
and class, but segregated into privileged minds and laboring bodies, many institutions (if
not all) must sustain themselves via whatever forms of repression are necessary to preserve
that status quo. That language is such a regime’s primary epistemic weapon and its
effective self-preserving use the first casualty for the body in pain is hardly surprising,
though it seems symptomatic of Scarry’s dualist impulse to align words with a still
composed subject and inarticulate wailing with the body in pain, as if minds speak but
bodies wail.
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Mind/body dualism must thus be understood to function as an institutionalized
algorithm to naturalize authority, affect the subjugation of bodies for the performance of
labor, and justify whatever means are necessary to maintain those institutions for their
beneficiaries. It facilitates the elision of the destructive effects of that subjugation, and it
contains admission of its bodily and psychic damage to specific instances of violence,
effacing the roles that race, sex, and class play in the larger context. Mind/body dualism
also functions to institutionalize violence as both immediate spectacle and enduring
imprimatur of regimes that reserve rights associated with specific linguistic practices to
themselves as knowers. To ignore these dynamics is to effectively re-inscribe them by
omission. To invoke the body in pain as if it can be dissociated from the histories within
which violence has become as ordinary as a language that swaps words like “Muslim” for
“Nigger,” “Democrat” for “Commie,” or “migrant” for “alien” is to effectively muzzle its
subject long before pain becomes the warp and woof of her/his reality. Such bodies can
generate empathy—but they cannot assert themselves as subjects, much less foment
resistance.
The sex-trafficked Malaysian girl instantiates her subjugated status as, for
example, a member of an inferiorized minority, the Rohingya, an oppressed sex, female,
and as an involuntary embodiment of Thailand’s porous borders, themselves “policed” via
a social order invested not, and Ranciere might put it (Thesis 4), in the validation of
citizenry, but in the preservation of the status of nation states and trading partners in the
global social order (Ranciere 2001: 5). Her pain is thus not silenced; it is preemptively
elided as an inadmissible disruption of the logic constitutive of the international order
(ibid.). This order can be nothing other than reinforced, moreover, by her violent death.
And that will and must remain true despite the cathartic release of outrage by humanitarian
organizations, or even countries like United States who keep lists of violators whom they
“downgrade” and “upgrade” depending upon their own social and economic interests. But
that is the irony of the relationship between subjectification and subjugation. It would, for
example, be folly to believe that the outcry against human trafficking resulting from the
discovery of twenty-four mass graves at the Malay/Thai border as recently as August 2015
counts as “fomenting resistance” (Reuters/The Guardian, August 2015). Such discoveries
do affect renewed calls for human rights protections, and they do signal to offending
countries the need to participate in the discourse of “democracy,” “human rights,” and
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“freedom.” They do embolden a handful of intrepid human rights celebrities, for example,
Angelina Jolie, Bono, or Ricky Martin (Human Trafficking Exists, 2011).
But insofar as all such lofty ideas are preemptively subsumed by an order which
posits its subjects first and foremost as subjugates and commodities (whether they’re sextrafficked children or Hollywood superstars), insofar, that is, as “the body in pain” can be
treated as an abstraction dissociated from the particularities of ethnicity, sex, class, and
geography, the only “consensus” at which it can arrive with respect to the examples like
that of human trafficking is merely the “annulment of dissensus,” that is, the anticipatory
termination of dissent redressed in the language of “peaceful discussion and reasonable
agreement.” Appeals to mind/body dualism, in other words, make bodies available to the
very institutions that simultaneously rely on their labor and are empowered to ignore the
pain experienced by their subjugates. As Ranciere puts it (Thesis 10),
The essence of consensus is not peaceful discussion and reasonable
agreement as opposed to conflict or violence. Its essence is the
annulment of dissensus as the separation of the sensible from itself, the
annulment of surplus subjects, the reduction of the people to the sum of
the parts of the social body, and of the political community to the
relationship of interests and aspirations of these different parts.
Consensus is the reduction of politics to the police. In other words, it is
the “end of politics” and not the accomplishment of its ends but, simply,
the return of the “normal” state of things which is that of politics' nonexistence. (Ranciere 2001: 14)
Sex-trafficked Malaysian children incarnate the separation of the sensible from
itself in the very “upgrade” of their country’s status; it’s only through the effective denial
of the sensible (and the denial of this denial—its elision), the “annulment of surplus
subjects,” that the consensus represented by the upgrade is made possible. But this
“consensus” is, in fact, not more than the annulment of dissensus, that is, the deposit of
“bodies in pain” in mass graves. These “parts of the social body” represent merely expired
utility; they epitomize the “reduction of politics to the police” precisely because their grim
discovery offers policing something to do which reinforces even as it acknowledges the
utter failure of the social order to protect its most vulnerable “parts.” Institutionalized
violence like human trafficking is thus certainly not the end of politics; rather, as Walter
Benjamin foretold long ago in his “Critique of Violence,” it simply demonstrates the extent
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to which violence forms a constitutive feature of the “normal” state of the things of
“politics.”

THE FUNCTION OF ERASURE, ELISION, AND EFFACEMENT
Scarry recognizes that the preemptive erasure of the possible effects of institutionalized
violence is crucial to legitimating a social order whose beneficiaries, like its casualties, are
defined by race, sex, class, culture, and geography. Of torture, she argues that “[t]he most
radical act of distancing resides in [the torturer’s] disclaiming of the other’s hurt. Within
the strategies of power based on denial there is “… a hierarchy of achievement, successive
intensifications based on increasing distance from … the body” (Scarry 1987: 57). By
attributing to the torturer as achievement the capacity to distance himself from the body of
the tortured, however, Scarry not only re-inscribes mind/body dualism to the purposes of
the torturer, she describes one of the ways in which the subject becomes the subjugated
through the torturer’s “achievement.” The logic is simple: mind/body dualism is reinscribed by the epistemic distance from the body required by “achievement.” Subjugation
describes this achievement because it describes the “as what” by which the subject is
temporarily constituted, but ultimately effaced and erased.
The American businessman travelling in Thailand who purchases an evening with
a sex-trafficked Malaysian child must distance himself from the fact that she may resemble
his own preteen daughters. The epistemic achievement represented in the cash exchange
with her handlers describes not only his achievement (and that of the pimp), but that of an
entire system dependent on the dualism that transforms bodies into labor, reserving “mind”
to its handful of authorized beneficiaries. The subject is thus subjectified as subjugated not
only in the torture (or the rape), but through the torturer’s disclaimer with respect to the
subject’s pain (as ancillary, for example, to acquiring information or achieving sexual
satisfaction, etc.). And while, of course, there exist important differences between the
actions of a paid interrogator whose goal is to elicit information and the businessman who
purchases a child for the purposes of sexual gratification, the crucial role of mind/body
dualism is essentially the same in both insofar as each must preclude as a matter of course
the subjectivity of their charge; each must perform his “achievement” under similarly
distancing epistemic conditions. Indeed, where the tortured is a man larger and stronger
than the torturer, the latter’s achievement is that much greater; the tortured is not only
subjugated, but feminized. Ironically, from the point of view of mind/body dualism, the
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torturer, the pimp, the businessman are all as substitutable as is the tortured, the child (the
refugee, the battered homemaker, the prisoner of war, the terrorist). What produces
“achievement” in the performance of torture or rape isn’t the reinforcement of the system
or regime that defines its authorized “minds” and its laboring “bodies, per se; it’s the
subjugation that instantiates the regime in the first place, and thus for that instance.
While the torturer, for example, is likely paid for his services, the tortured
subjugate can never in fact be recognized, much less humanized, as a subject. The
achievement of the torturer is to distance himself from the body in pain; the subject never
enters this equation; he/she is simply a conduit for information (or the fiction of
information), a public iteration of repression understood by that public as such. Put
differently: the infliction of pain legitimated through the institutionalization of violence
can be applied only to bodies, and only to particular bodies, and in that context torture
forms a specific commission or service of the actionable. The torturer’s job is to actuate
“the body in pain” and what this requires is ignoring the fact that the wails emitted from
the mouths of the tortured belong to a subject, and thus constitute atrocity. Ignoring
inconvenient facts is part of the design not only of torture, but of terrorism, rape, and war,
as it must be if their commissioned agents are to ascend in the hierarchy of achievement.
That design comes to form what is expected not only by the subjugated, but by the body
politic. The social hierarchy is itself, after all, racially and sexually dependent upon eliding
the subject as subjugated in that “subjugated” implies some form of repressive action
undertaken to enforce otherwise unjust convention, a human-made artifice. But the goal of
violence institutionalized is to naturalize subjugation within the very processes through
which subjects comprehend themselves as, say, black, or female, laborer, or refugee,
terrorist or insurgent.
Naturalized subjugation, in other words, can admit empathy and repress
resistance. After all, we can feel sorrowful for a state of affairs that feels unjust yet, as the
way of nature, is inalterable. From this perspective, the torturer (like the terrorist, the sextrafficker, the sweatshop capitalist, the slaver, the rapist, the war-monger) stands merely as
a metaphor for an achievement of much greater magnitude, namely, ensuring that the
subjugated conceive themselves not as subjugated but simply as victims of particular
events, horrific to be sure, but not necessarily an indictment of civilization itself conceived
as a natural reflection of human being. Such is the “spectacle” of power that is the state.
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A perverse metaphor for Aristotle’s psychic hierarchy imposed on the body
politic, acts of torture, sex-trafficking, terrorism, rape, slavery, and war signify
“civilization” insofar, as Scarry puts it, “[e]very act of civilization is an act of transcending
the body in a way consonant with the body’s needs” (ibid.). No doubt, Scarry would find
this formulation of “civilization” anathema to any transcendence “consonant with the
body’s needs.” But insofar as the laboring body is a projection of the dualist algorithm, its
only needs are to sub-serve civilization’s transcendence—and these can surely be met more
effectively through torture, terrorism, rape, slavery, and war than through art, music,
philosophy and literature. Transcendence, in other words, is itself a euphemism. It serves
to elide the objectives of institutionalized violence; it tamps down the possibility of revolt
against an unstable regime by offering cursory acknowledgement to the body as a locus of
need. But it nonetheless accords to acts of violence a legitimate and natural vehicle for
transcending, or better: walking over, the bodies of labor that form the stepping-stones of
that hierarchy.
“Torture,” writes Scarry, “is a condensation of the act of “overcoming” the body
present in benign forms of power” (ibid.). The trouble, however, is that her account doesn’t
entitle her to postulate “benign” unless she can show that the mind/body dualism that
threads its ways throughout can have “benign” incarnations—and that is far from obvious.
What Scarry fails to see is that the algorithm that informs her construal of bodies, subjects,
and power precludes the benign in favor of a regime whose stratification of race, sex, and
class into laboring bodies has less benevolent objectives. Mind/body dualism advantages
not only the torturer but the pimp, the businessman, the patriarch, the dictator at the expense
of the tortured, the sex-trafficked, the battered, the oppressed. That is the naturalized,
sexualized, racialized social regime. Put differently: because Scarry fails to undertake a
more specific account of the circumstances of subjectification as subjugation, she
effectively precludes more benign possibilities of overcoming. It may be that no such
account is possible given the ways in which mind/body dualism is imbricated and
institutionalized in the uses of violence. It may be that “overcoming” is already overdetermined by its own hierarchical positing of “mind” and “body.” But without attention
paid to the role of race, sex, class, and geography in determining subjectification as
subjugated, there’s no obvious avenue via which to explore exceptions or exemptions.
Scarry turns to the body in pain, but away from the “civilization” through which
the subject is affected, a social order whose survival depends upon the elision of
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subjugation as subjugation. Hence her account can offer empathy to the torture victim, the
sex-trafficked girl—but no path to resistance. “Elision” thus elicits two meanings in this
context: first, and most obvious, as the dissociation of the “body in pain” from the epistemic
situation of the experiencing subject from the point of view of transcendence, and second
as a metaphor for a subject preemptively silenced, a subjugate whose voice is elided,
silenced by the terror which inscribes her epistemic situation as, for example, enslaved,
tortured, raped, sold. Turning to the “body in pain,” Scarry forecloses the side of affect;
she leaves out of consideration violence institutionalized as a strategy to sustain the regime,
legitimating its effacement as the cause of suffering, and thereby helping to elide, in both
senses, the subjugated subject. There is, moreover, no additional account or supplement to
remedy Scarry’s turn since, insofar as her account of the “body in pain” depends on turning
away from the institutionalized forces underpinning it, she has no ground upon which to
stake an account on the side of affect, no body to supplement.

THE ALGORITHM OF THE REGIME:
“BODY IN PAIN” AND “READER OF THE BODY IN PAIN”
Scarry is not alone in what constitutes a kind of existential myopia. As reader/listeners we
too turn to the body in pain, and away from the violent dynamics responsible not merely
for suffering itself, but for the subject who suffers. Perhaps we do so because, confronted
with suffering our first reaction is empathy or compassion. Perhaps we value opportunities
to be modest heroes. Where suffering is compounded by injustice, we’re indignant and
incredulous. We respond with an all-encompassing compassion; we’re outraged by the
Islamic State bombings in Paris; we demand a higher minimum wage; we condemn
Malaysian sex-traffickers; we bomb chemical weapons depots in Syria; we weep for sick
children in detention in American border camps. Still, insofar as we attend solely to “the
body in pain,” we’re as liable as any for silencing the subjugated subject—regardless how
loudly we may evince incredulity. Indeed, we may even delude ourselves into thinking that
calling out the injustice of suffering counts as calling attention to the institutions
responsible for it. But discharging anger is in no way the same thing as engaging in
resistance, though the former often passes for the latter, thereby effacing even more
effectively the subjugation of those whose bodies function both as laboring disposables
and as opportunities for privileged others to discharge empathy.
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Perhaps, however, it’s an overly cynical reading of empathy to cast it as something
merely discharged. Empathy, evinced through the ministrations of others, argues the
reader/listener is what helps the subjugated subject to regain her voice. The trouble is that
it doesn’t; indeed, precisely the reverse may be true. Insofar as we as privileged others
undertake no real risk in attending to the body in pain, insofar as our actions, even if
voluble, remain well behind the safe walls of any substantive challenge to the social order,
“discharge” is all that remains. Getting to be those who turn to the body in pain reminds us
that we’re good, that we’re capable of empathy, and that we’re not them—either the
tortured or the torturer. Theorizing the body in pain helps to reinforce our exemption from
whatever amalgam of race, sex, or class that might otherwise threaten us with subjugation.
In effect, we turn to the body in pain in order to turn away from the subjugated subject and
the possibility that we stand on the side of the torturer’s civilization, legitimating
subjugation not merely by turning away, but by reinforcing the mind/body dualism that
underwrites it.
The turn itself is structured to reassure the reader/listener of The Body in Pain that
it will not be interpreted as resistance to the institutions culpable for it; it’s myopia makes
it safe. Its discharge of anger sans any substantive demand for change reinforces the
regime’s spectacle of power by omission. However contrary to Scarry’s intention, The
Body in Pain invites just such a reading when she argues that pain is unlike other states of
consciousness because, unlike love of, fear of, or hatred of, “physical pain has no
referentiality.” As Bakare-Yusef puts it,
its nonreferentiality, prevents and inhibits the transformation of the felt
experiences of pain, leaving it to reside in the body, where the sufferer
reverts back to a prelinguistic state of incomprehensible wailing,
inaudible whisper, inarticulate screeching, primal whispering, which
destroys language and all that is associated with language: subjectivity,
civilization, culture, meaning, and understanding. (Bakare-Yusef 1999:
314)
In other words, according to Scarry, pain de-subjectifies; it deconstructs the
subjective integrity of the subject by undermining the safety and self-possession of her
body. Pain, for Scarry, “resides in the body” like the horrific infection depicted in The
Walking Dead; it compels the “sufferer” to revert to a primal state, inarticulate and
screaming, and in so doing its nonreferentiality posits the reader/listener of “the body in
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pain” as “empathetic” precisely because we recognize and accept pain’s nonreferentiality.
We’re neither required nor solicited to look further.
The trouble with this construal is that both the subject who’s reduced to
inarticulate wailing and the reader who empathetically turns to her are in fact fictions
supplied by the institutions in whose interest it is to create occasions for deflating the
tension and anguish that foment resistance. On the side of the body in pain, that occasion
consists either in resignation, dissimulation, even death, or in the promise that should any
turn in its direction, it will be to the pain alone—that its nonreferentiality will be honored,
that empathy will fill the vacuum where language has been abandoned. On the side of the
reader/listener, it consists in getting to be the one who extends concern—so long as the
rules that govern turning to the pain are strictly observed—that any further analysis of its
responsible parties is strictly omitted. In other words, the relationship of the de-subjectified
subject—the body in pain—and the empathetic reader are not merely contained by the
institutionalized violence of “civilization,” they are an essential part of its algorithm, its
legitimation and maintenance. Neither can be made sense of outside the dualistic impulse
that governs turning to “the body in pain,” yet neither in fact exist or could exist outside
the regime which deposits each in their respective places as “the sufferer” and “the angel
of mercy.” Both are therefore subjugates.
It’s only, moreover, within the context of this perverse fiction that we can make
sense of the reversion of the subject to a prelinguistic state: only that subject could be so
destroyed since only that subject would be unprepared to experience that pain. If, in other
words, the experience of pain has no causal reference, no origin not preemptively
consigned to the merely incidental, the subject’s in no position to expect it. But this seems
absurd since, however cursory is the acknowledgement of the reader/listener, it’s also
because the causes are, for example, torture or slavery, that the reader turns to the body in
pain at all. It will do no good to object that my critique of Scarry’s nonreferentiality
downplays the experience of pain as a blocking out of all but the pain itself—that such is
the phenomenal character of at least great pain. Pain is at least in part made great by being
expected; yet expectation precludes nonreferentiality. Indeed, terror—expecting a future
infliction of pain—forms a crucial feature of subjugation, insuring compliance not through
pain itself, but through the terrorizing anticipation of suffering. We can make no sense of
this anticipation save for the institutionalized violence that makes it real for the subjugated
subject.
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Pain cannot, therefore, be nonreferential. It can be overwhelming; it can
crystallize the meaning of subjugation; it can render the subject temporarily speechless.
But insofar as terrorizing expectation is an aspect of pain at least under the conditions
Scarry discusses, pain always and necessarily refers—even if the subject doesn’t know it,
and even if the reader is destined to ignore the object of that reference. A subject
subjectified via the terror intrinsic to institutionalized violence experiences pain as no less
painful, but also as no less subjectifying since its systemic effect in undermining her bodily
self-possession—its capacity to affect subjugation—is itself intrinsic to her identity. The
experience of pain thus signifies the subject’s status both as a laboring instantiation of
“body” and, however epistemically opaque to her, as a subject capable of resistance if only
to particular experiences of pain, if only to herself, and even if as an act of sheer survival.
“CIVILIZATION”/SUBJUGATION/RETURNING TO TORTURE
A final, perhaps maximally concrete, way of articulating the trouble with The Body in Pain
is that Scarry has the relationship between particular experiences of subjugation and the
regimes responsible for them backwards. While she insists pain de-subjectifies the subject
by destroying the subject’s linguistic tether to “civilization, culture, and meaning,” thus
reducing the capacity for resistance to inarticulate “whispers,” she casts “civilization” as
largely generic, eliding the constitutive role played by violence in the institutions within
which “civilization” itself consists. To attribute the silencing of the subject to the
experience of subjugation miscasts the silencing and the subjugation as effects when
they’re in fact essential preconditions of the social order. This isn’t just because silence is
a constitutive characteristic of the subjugated subject, it’s because the infliction of pain
cannot be understood as a threat to that constitution except under conditions where it’s
unexpected; and it isn’t unexpected. It’s formative.
Torture doesn’t subjugate; it signifies subjugation. Torture doesn’t threaten to
unravel civilization; it instantiates it as the terror necessary to preserve its always unstable
spectacle of power. The terrorist, for example, is well acquainted with the protocols of
waterboarding; the slave comprehends whipping as a regular feature of life; the sextrafficked child learns very quickly to associate sexuality and brutality. The meanings of
words like “expectation” or “silence” are, as Wittgenstein might have it, in their uses; their
acculturated meaning inseparable from the institutions within which language functions to
naturalize power. Thus it cannot be the particular experience of pain that affects the silence,
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but rather the expectation of its recurrence; silence is not an effect of suffering, but rather
its precondition. It’s not that the de-subjectified subject is reduced to pre-linguistic
whispers; it’s that the regime assigns voice only to its beneficiaries. The best description
of a civilization that relies on institutionalized violence might, indeed, simply be “terror.”
In his 2013 review of The Body in Pain, Samuel Moyn offers one way to conceive
this form of terror. He argues that “between the nether pole of torture and the high summit
of creation, a crucial piece of terrain is missing in Scarry’s thought: the place where the
real politics of workaday institutions—the very ones that both cause torture and can avert
it—happen” (Moyn 2013). These “workaday” institutions turn out to be critical to
understanding the extent to which Scarry’s argument that the experience of pain
(necessarily) agitates against the processes of subjectification is undermined by her failure
to appreciate the role that even the most violent and oppressive of institutions play in it.
The issue here is not, however, merely that she misses the possibility of conditions under
which the experience of pain contributes to subjectification, but that because these are the
conditions of institutionalized violence, she misses what’s essential to subjectification in a
world made and unmade by the beneficiaries of that violence, namely, the many varieties
of resistance through which the subject can reclaim themselves against the relative safety
of conformity to subjugation.
It’s hard to imagine an example of either the material or the psychic space where
such a reclamation might occur than along the unstable interstices which characterize the
relationship between the terrorism of the Islamic State, calls in the United States and
elsewhere to return to methods like water-boarding to extract information from ISIS
suspects, and the current flight of Syrian refugees. But in light of our subversive reading
of Scarry’s “body in pain,” I think we can say this much:


The acts of terrorist organizations like the Islamic State are not departures from
civilization, but realizations of it. However much terrorism is cast as a reaction to
Western values, culture or consumption; however much ISIS represents itself as
religious jihadism, its carefully orchestrated brutality instantiates “civilization” as
one of its most unadorned “spectacles of power” to date. The Paris bombings
illustrate the “workaday” politics of an organization that could not have come into
being without the ideological and material infrastructure supplied by a militarized
and fully capitalized planet that depends at a minimum on war, torture, and the
subjugation of laboring bodies human and nonhuman. That this regime can trace
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its roots to ancient efforts to justify a stratified social order based on race, sex, and
class only restates the claim that “the body in pain” is best understood as a meme
for the relationships upon which civilization is realized as terror, or perhaps a
metaphor for the sheer intransigence of a dualist worldview instantiated not only
in beheadings and bombings, but in sweat shops and factory farms, drug cartels
and the Syrian, Mexican, or Aboriginal Australian flight from drought.


Calls to bring back, say, waterboarding as a strategy to extract information from
Islamic State terrorists is neither surprising nor inconsistent with “civilization.”
Just as terrorism instantiates “civilization” as a challenge to the claims of the
nation state to authority, so too torture legitimates the utility of violence in the
“good” nation, that is, the regime that wages so-called war on terror. Republican
presidential candidate Donald Trump, for example, recently said that he “would
bring it [torture] back,” and that “waterboarding is peanuts compared to what
they’d do to us …” (Prior 2015).



While there’s much to say here, what’s especially significant is that Trump has
been treated to considerable applause for an argument that’s plainly retributive;
it’s not in keeping with at least our more romantic notions of “civilization.”
Consider too his speculation that Syrian migration might be a Trojan Horse for
Islamic jihadists. Although (or perhaps because) no reliable evidence supports
such claims, what allows him to make them and rewards him for doing so with
rising poll numbers, is that these are the claims we expect to hear because we
identify the war on terrorism with what a civilized society is entitled if not morally
required to do. What’s remarkable about Trump is not that he’d “bring back” a
torture strategy outlawed by the Geneva Conventions; it’s not that the evidence is
abundantly clear that torture doesn’t work. It’s that the claim passes for
unremarkable in a country that advertises itself as the epitome of Western
civilization. The irony, of course, is that that may well be true.



Lastly, were we to stick to Scarry’s view of how pain desubjectifies the subject,
we’d not be able to adequately or accurately understand the actions—much less
the lives—of, for example, Syrian refugees. Dehumanized in the mercenary
rhetoric of privileged men like Donald Trump, forced from their homes by not
merely civil war but the creeping effects of desertification, the plight of Syrian
refugees—like nearly all refugees—indicts “civilization” as the abject failure of
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power wielded as capitalist excess, military incursion, religious unreason, and
government sponsored oppression. As we’re now beginning to experience via
anthropogenic climate change, violence institutionalized as multinational
capitalism may foreshadow the most damning evidence to date of the
consequences of “civilization.”
Should our focus remain squarely on the “bodies in pain” of the Syrian refugees, we’ll not
only fail to comprehend the larger forces at work in their migration, we’ll also not be able
to see how these forces that subjugate simultaneously subjectify. But they do. From the
young man or woman who becomes radicalized by Islamic State recruiters to the family
who waits the 22 months to be approved to move to Indiana—only to be told they can’t
settle there—subjugation creates the subject of “civilization” as surely as its hierarchy of
race, sex, and class creates its buildings, its machinery, its weapons, and its institutions.
That such a subject is judged to be damaged can only be assessed from the point of view
of some more ideal, even romanticized, notion of civilization. But while that may form the
un-interrogated backdrop of Scarry’s “body in pain,” it does not describe the world that,
even in Aristotle’s flirtation with justice and equality, bears little more than a family
resemblance to our own. Hence, we cannot judge the radicalized jihadist to be “damaged,”
at least not more so than the sweatshop laborer or the sex-trafficked teenager. Each mirrors
the social order of the subjugated subject upon whose bodies are inscribed quite literally
the body politic in pain.
Each, however, are also potential sites of resistance. The trouble is that what
“resistance” can mean in this context is more than murky since it can as readily take the
form of the Jihadist’s explosive belt, the laborer’s suicide from the factory roof, or the sextrafficked girl’s retreat into heroin. That is, insofar as institutionalized violence remains the
hallmark of “civilization,” insofar as it constitutes the primary ingredient in what
subjectifies us all, affecting our dispositions and dispossessing us of the capacity for
epistemic dispassion, we have no obviously stable ground upon which to stake a claim for
humanity, and against which we can decide to condemn the jihadist, unionize the laborer,
treat the child-addict, or resettle the Syrian refugees. Crucial, nonetheless, is that insofar as
we can get even to this juncture, we can be sure of one thing: we are not reducible to bodies
in pain, and while the silence of conformity may form the conditions of our workaday lives,
we cannot be de-subjectified short of death.
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NOTE
1.

Scarry’s narrowing of focus to the particular subject of interrogation is open to the
same criticism leveled against her account of slavery, namely, that it risks distortion
in virtue of an implicit ahistoricity. Although we’re not pursuing that line of argument
here, a reading of Erlenbusch-Anderson may provide a useful object of comparison on
this point.
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